Indigenous Rights and International Human Rights Courts: Between Specificity and Circulation of Principles by Ruozzi, Elisa
Elisa Ruozzi 
 
Indigenous rights and international human rights courts : between specificity 
and circulation of principles. 
 
1. Introduction: the emergence of indigenous rights in the context of the human right to a decent 
environment. - 2. The European Court of Human Rights and indigenous populations. - 2.1 The recognition  
of indigenous rights in the internal legal order. - 2.2 Evidence of prejudice: a heavy burden of proof. - 2.3 
The denial of the victim status to associations representing indigenous rights. - 3. The jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. - 3.1 The refusal of a formalistic approach in dealing with 
procedural matters.- 3.2 The recognition of the specificity of indigenous people and the necessity of actions 
of positive discrimination. - 3.3 The full recognition of the communal system of property and the relationship 
between possession of land and other human rights. - 4. The Endorois case before the African Commission 




1. Introduction: the emergence of indigenous rights in the context of the human right to a 
decent environment. 
The progressive emergence of indigenous rights is one of the most significant features of 
contemporary international law and it is part of the more general issue of the relationship between 
human rights and the environment.  
As a matter of fact, indigenous rights have been dealt with by international human rights tribunals 
in relation to the special link existing between these populations and the surrounding environment.  
Therefore, before going into details of the jurisprudence of international human rights tribunals, it is 
worth recalling some of the challenges that indigenous rights pose to the international system for 
the protection of human rights1. 
First of all, indigenous rights tend to be collective rights, whereas western legal doctrine is based on 
individual rights and tends to refuse forms of actio popularis, as evidence of the existence of an 
individual prejudice is required.  
Secondly – but the two problems are inextricably linked - the identification of a single titleholder is 
impossible, as indigenous people are organised in groups2. Courts therefore struggle in deciding 
                                                 
1 R.S. PATHAK, The human rights system as a conceptual frame work for environmental law, in E.B. WEISS ed., 
Environmental Change and International Law: New challenges and dimensions, Tokyo, 1992, p.233 ss.; M.L. 
SCHWARTZ, International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse, in Yale Journal of International 
Law, 1993, p.364 ss.; J.C. MERRILLS, Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual aspects, Oxford, 
1996, p.32-33; J. LEE, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment as a Principle of customary International Law, in Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, 2000, 
p.293 ss.; P.T. TAKOUKAM, Les individus et le droit de l’environnement, in Pour un droit commun de l'environnement 
: melanges en l'honneur de Michel Prieur, Paris, 2007, p.685 ss..  
2 M. DÉJEANT-PONS, The Right to environment in Regional Human Rights Systems, in K.E. MAHONEY, P. MAHONEY, 
(ed.), Human Rights in the Twenty-first Century, The Hague, 1993, p.611-612; see also A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, 
The contribution of international human rights law to environmental protection, with special reference to global 
whether the duty of the State to guarantee (for instance) a decent environment is owed to the group 
meant as a collective entity or to the members of the group considered individually3. 
Also, once identified the boundaries of the group, it is necessary to establish who can legitimately 
represent them and act in order to protect their rights; this is particularly evident as far as inter-
generational rights4 and indigenous rights are concerned.  
Finally, given the importance of the environmental dimension in the case-law regarding indigenous 
peoples, it is necessary to recall some general problems regarding the idea of a human right to a 
decent environment. This idea has progressively gained strength over the last few years both in 
international jurisprudence and in the main human rights instruments, at the regional and 
international level. Still, the doctrine is not unanimous about the effectiveness of a human right-
based approach to environmental protection.  
The creation of this kind of right upon individuals can make the conciliation of competing rights 
more difficult, since the right to a decent environment has to be balanced against other individual 
rights, such as the right to private property; as a consequence, the resolution of the problem, through 
for example, compromise, will be harder to accept.  
Also, the proliferation of rights and of respective titleholders could multiply conflicts and 
accentuate tensions within society; it has also been observed that the stressing of civil and moral 
rights could make the realization of values - such as cooperation and civic sense - harder5.  
Assuming the idea of a human right to a decent environment as “the individual right to be protected 
also through the protection of one's own environment”6,  a first difficulty arises from the attribution 
of a specific meaning to the term “environment”, not only because of the complexity of the term, 
but also because any meaning assigned to this word must be put in relation with a socio-economic 
                                                                                                                                                                  
environmental change, in E.B. WEISS ed., Environmental Change and international law: New challenges and 
dimensions, Tokyo, 1992, p.305. 
3 J.C. MERRILLS, Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual aspects, cit., p.34 ss.; E. SPIRY, Protection 
de l’environnement et Droit International des droits de l’homme – De la dialectique à la symbiose, in Revue de 
Droit International de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, 1996, p.178 ss.; G. HERCZEGH, Droits individuels et 
droits collectifs (mythes et realités), in Les hommes et l'environnement : quels droits pour le vingt-et-unième siècle?: 
études en hommage à Alexandre Kiss, Paris, 1998, p.171 ss.; F. FRANCIONI, International Human Rights in an 
Environmental Horizon, in European Journal of International Law, 2010, p.41 ss. 
4  On the issue of inter-generational rights see: E. BROWN WEISS, In fairness to future generations: International law, 
common patrimony, and intergenerational equity, Tokyo, 1988; Agora: What obligations does our generation owe to 
the Next? An approach to global environmental responsibility, in American Journal of International  Law, 1990, 
p.190 ss.; J.M. GABA, Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to future Generations: Future Rights and 
Present Virtue, in Columbia Journal of International Law, 199l, p.249 ss.; on the inter-temporal dimension of human 
rights see: A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, The contribution of international human rights law to environmental 
protection, with special reference to global environmental change, cit., p.255 ss.;  
5  J.C. MERRILLS, Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual aspects, in A.E. BOYLE, M.R. 
ANDERSON, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, Oxford, 1996, p.29; on the recognition of 
“new” human rights see P. ALSTON, Conjuring up New Human Rights:  A Proposal for Quality Control, in American 
Journal of International  Law, 1984, p.607 ss. 
6  A. KISS, Définition et nature juridique d’un droit de l’homme à l’environnement, in P. KROMAREK, Environnement 
et droit de l’homme, Paris, 1987, p.17. 
context7. This is the reason why some authors think that the expression “equal environment” can 
imply the creation of a standard aimed at the preservation of nature at a realistic level, more than the 
realization of a perfect environment, this objective actually being impossible to obtain8. 
 
2. The European Court of Human Rights and indigenous populations. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was established with the aim of guaranteeing a set 
of basic civil and political rights, enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights, signed in 
Rome in 1950. The Convention is based on a negative approach, and has therefore been conceived 
as an instrument requiring States to refrain from interfering with individual rights; nevertheless, 
with the passing of time and the evolution of the international human rights landscape, the 
application of the Convention changed. European judges are therefore required, nowadays, to 
interpret this instrument in conformity with the “theory of positive obligations”, according to which 
States have to actively pursue the objectives stated in the Convention and adopt positive actions in 
order to make the realisation of rights effective. 
Notwithstanding this evolution, the impact of the Convention over the protection of individual 
rights is limited by some original features, among which the concept of “victim” traditionally 
applied. According to the Court's consolidated jurisprudence, the notion of “victim” has been the 
object of a restrictive interpretation: the prejudice must be actual, and not potential; the claimant 
must show an existing interference in its individual rights, capable of damaging him personally; in 
other terms, there must be a “direct link” between the claimant and the alleged prejudice9.  
As we will see in the analysis of the jurisprudence, this feature has a direct impact on the protection 
of rights of indigenous peoples. 
Another important element to be taken into account in order to understand the jurisprudence of the 
ECHR is the theory of the “margin of appreciation”. The theory, which is both an interpretative and 
a conceptual tool at the same time10, was firstly formulated in the well-known Lawless case, where 
the Court stated: 
“This being so, and having regard to the high responsibility which a Government has to its people 
to protect them against any threat to the life of the nation, it is evident that a certain discretion - a 
certain margin of appreciation – must be left to the Government in determining whether there exists 
                                                 
7  Ibidem, p.20. 
8  H.-J. UIBOPUU, Internationally guaranteed right of an individual to a clean environment, in Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 1977, p.110. 
9  Noel Narvii Tauira and others v. France, case n. 28204/95, 4 December 1995, p.130; Soering v. the United 
Kingdom case n.14038/88, 7 July 1989, par.90. 
10 O.J.-GUILLARMOD, Règles, méthodes et principes d’interprétation dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme, in L.-E. PETTITI, E. DECAUX, P, LAMBERT, La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 
Paris, 1999, p.50: “Au-delà  de sa dimension doctrinale, l’idée de la “marge d’appréciation” reconnue aux autorité 
nationales véhicule aussi (une méthode, qui se trouve en opposition dialectique avec l’idée «d’autonomie» des 
concepts conventionnels.” 
a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and which must be dealt with by 
exceptional measures derogating from its normal obligations under the Convention”11.  
This concept is therefore central in the analysis of the Court's judicial review, i.e. the intensity of the 
control over States' actions. 
 
2.1 The recognition  of indigenous rights in the internal legal order. 
Claims concerning indigenous rights have been brought before the European Court mainly by 
members of the Sami population, whose lands and hunting rights had been violated by the State. 
In the case of G. and E. v. Finland, some representatives of the Sami population alleged a violation 
of article 8 (right to private and family life) and article 1 of the First Additional Protocol (protection 
of property) due to the construction of a dam, which caused the flooding of the valley where they 
lived12. The kind of property claimed by this population was linked to occupation and traditional 
possession of land, on the basis of categories which are different from those normally used in the 
Finnish legal order. This is confirmed by the statement, made by claimants, according to which it 
would have been impossible for them to institute legal proceedings in order to establish their status 
of legitimate owners of the territory13. The Court does not examine this issue in details, but simply 
states that claimants did not substantiate their property claims guaranteed by article 1 of the First 
Protocol; the recourse is therefore declared manifestly unfounded.   
However, in the case  Könkäma v. Sweden – where Sami members complain about an amendment to 
an existing law, to extend exclusive fishing and hunting rights to non-Sami members - rights 
claimed by Sami villages are considered “possessions” under article 114. The difference in the 
Court's attitude lies in the fact that the internal legal order recognized Sami rights over land and 
natural resources: according to Section 25 of the Reindeer Herding Act, a member of a Sami village 
may, with certain restrictions, hunt and fish on the land allocated to the village.  This particular 
section is placed under the heading “The Exercise of the Reindeer Herding Right”, indicating that 
the right to hunt and fish is part of the Sami's immemorial right to herd reindeer.  This act is also the 
basis of Sami rights in the case Handölsdalen Sami and others v. Sweden15. 
Finally, in the case Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry v. Finland16, the applicability of article 1 is taken for 
granted, but here again there was an internal legal basis provided by the 1998 Fishing Act. 
Therefore, the recognition of indigenous rights seems to be directly linked to the existence of a 
                                                 
11  Lawless v. Ireland, case n.332/57, report of the Commission, 19 December 1959, p.85. 
12  G. e E. v. Norway, case n. 9278/81, 3 October 1983 p.31. 
13  Ibidem, p.34 
14  Konkäma and 38 Sami villages v. Sweden, ricorso n.27033/95, decision, 25 november 1996, p.85. Cfr. F. SUDRE, 
Droit Communautaire des droits fondamentaux – Année 2000, in Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l'Homme, 2001, 
p.910.  
15   Handölsdalen Sami and others v. Sweden, case n.39013/04, 30 March 2010, par.52. 
16  Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry and others v. Finland, case n.42969/98, 10 January 2005, p.11. 
national law establishing them. If, on one hand, the close relationship existing between the Court 
and the internal legal order is certainly a heavy burden on the protection of individual rights, on the 
other hand we have to consider that this feature is not specific to indigenous issues, but is a general 
characteristic informing the whole Court's jurisprudence. The subsidiary nature of the Court, 
according to which the Strasbourg system only intervenes if and when individual rights are not duly 
protected at the national level, has as one of its consequences the fact that the Court relies a great 
deal on the determinations of internal tribunals and on the existence of an internal source of the 
allegedly violated rights.  
Lastly, it is to be remarked that, in the Strasbourg system, the non-recognition of a certain right has 
a double set of consequences: applicants will be prevented from invoking not only the provisions of 
the European Convention directly stating these rights (such as article 1 of the First Protocol), but 
also the provision affirming the right to due process (article 6), concerning the defence of “civil 
rights and obligations”. In order for this article to be applicable, the Court has to assess the 
existence of rights (property is a typical example) for the protection of which the claimant submits a 
recourse; as a consequence, if the Court does not admit the existence of these rights, the denial of 
justice sometimes suffered by indigenous populations (under the form of lack of access to a 
tribunal) cannot be analysed at the light of the European Convention.  
On the contrary, in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, the duty of the State to guarantee 
the enjoyment of the rights included in the Convention is the starting point; therefore, failure to 
provide the recognition of rights does not exempt the State from responsibility – as it would be  
according to a formalistic approach, because if the right does not exist, there is no point in invoking 
it.  On the contrary, in the light of the principle of effectiveness and of the “need of protection of 
vulnerable individuals”, a broad interpretation of the right to recognition to juridical personality be 
followed, with the consequence that the State is especially bound to guarantee this right to people in 
the situation of necessity and vulnerability17. 
 
2.2 Evidence of  prejudice: a heavy burden of proof. 
Another problem faced by indigenous peoples' representatives in the European system is the burden 
of proof required by the Court in order to show the existence of a prejudice. In the case G. and E. v. 
Norway mentioned above, judges recognized that, in principle, article 8 of the Convention protects 
the right of minorities to conduct their traditional lifestyle18 and they admit the negative effects that 
the construction of the dam would have on their quality of life. On the other side, they underline 
that Sami populations were not actually prevented from practising fishing, farming and hunting 
                                                 
17 Xákmok Kásek indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 24 August 2010, Series C n.214, par.249-250. 
18 G. and E. v. Norway, cit., p.35. 
activities19; more precisely, they underline the existence of wide areas, situated in the north part of 
Norway, suitable for these activities. As a consequence, the area compromised because of the 
construction of the dam was relatively small20; this factor - matched with the idea, inspired by an 
effectiveness principle, according to which claimants were able to continue their traditional 
activities – determines a lessening of the damage suffered.  
The Court then recalls the second paragraph of article 8 (listing some objectives for the realisation 
of which the State can legitimately limit the right to private and family life), with the aim of 
balancing individual rights on one hand and national interests on the other. Still, the reasoning 
followed is open to criticism where it affirms that, “without ascertaining the extent and nature of the 
interference” with individual rights, after careful consideration of the necessity of the project, the 
interference can reasonably be justified21. The balancing process appears to be biased, as the two 
competing interests are assigned different values: the prejudice of individual rights is not subject to 
a careful assessment, whereas the necessity of the project is the object of  “careful consideration”. It 
is therefore reasonable to question, in the light of this balancing exercise, how the construction of 
the dam can be considered “reasonably necessary”. Moreover, the lessening of the prejudice 
(deriving from the availability of other lands assigned to carrying out traditional activities) had 
already established the premises for a de-valuation of claimants' traditional lifestyle.  
The attitude of the Court is a typical example of how the margin of appreciation doctrine can 
operate in favour of the State: faced with a conflict between the rights of a minority and the 
economic interests deriving from important public works, the Court clearly sides with the latter.  
The ambivalence of the margin of appreciation doctrine clearly emerges: as has already noted by 
doctrine, the margin of appreciation acts sometimes as an element at the basis of the deference of 
the Court towards the State, and other times as a pretext for this deference which is, in a certain 
sense, established a priori22.  
A similar pattern is found in the case of Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry v. Sweden, where the Court notes 
that “the precise scope of the traditional fishing and other rights belonging to the Sámi population” 
was not clear at the relevant time” and that this seems to be a complex legal, historical and political 
issue. Starting from the assumption that the piece of legislation challenged by the claimants had not 
been drafted with the aim of reducing Sami rights, the Court states that the national measure “does 
not seem to have changed the substance” of the existing regulation. As a consequence, the 
                                                 
19  Idem. 
20  Ibidem, p.36. 
21  M. DEJEANT-PONS, Le droit de l’homme à l’environnement, droit fondamental au niveau européen dans le cadre du 
Conseil de l’Europe, et la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés 
fondamentales, cit., p.380. 
22  As affirmed by R. DESGAGNÉ (Integrating environmental values into the European Convention on Human Rights, in 
American Journal of International Law, 1995, p.551) “The Court must be well aware that its “margin of 
appreciation” is an easy device for deference to the defendant State” (emphasis added). 
applicants' legal status has not been weakened23.   
The conclusion of the Court is that claimants have not succeeded in showing the impact of the new 
law on their likelihood of exercising traditional fishing rights. In particular, the imposition of fees 
for fishing licenses is not considered relevant, as they do not apply to Sami fishing rights and the 
aim pursued by the law (the protection of fish stock) is considered a legitimate objective, justifying 
the interference in individual rights24. 
 
2.3 The denial of the victim status to associations representing indigenous rights. 
According to article 34 of the European Convention, complaints can be introduced by individuals, 
groups, or non-governmental organisations25. 
Therefore, the Convention contemplates the possibility, for a collective entity such as an association 
representing indigenous peoples, to act on behalf of its members. Still, this possibility has to be 
reconciled with the requirements stemming from the victim status and with the prohibition of actio 
popularis mentioned in the introduction. 
This poses a serious obstacle to the representation of indigenous rights, which are very often 
collective in nature. 
In the case Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry and others v. Finland, the victim status of the NGO representing 
indigenous interests is denied, because the claimant association is not responsible for fishing and 
does not represent its members in this regard. Moreover, the rights designated in the Fishing Act 
(the national measure under challenge) can be exercised by a Sami only as a private individual26. 
Two elements are crucial in this reasoning. First of all, the restrictive approach adopted by the Court 
in determining the association's status: if we consider that the aim pursued by Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry 
is the promotion of Sami culture, it follows that the only condition under which the victim status 
could have been recognized was a complete coincidence between the object of the claim and the 
aim pursued by the association.  
Secondly, the conception of rights adopted by the Court – affirming that fishing rights can only be 
exercised by individuals – completely fails to take into account the collective dimension of 
indigenous culture. 
On the contrary, the victim status of the claimant is not put into discussion both in the Konkäma 
                                                 
23 Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry v. Sweden, cit., p.18. 
24 Idem. 
25 On the notion of victim as applied by the ECHR see: K. ROGGE, The «victim» requirement in Article 25 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, in F. MATSCHER, H. PETZOLD, Protection des droits de l’homme: la 
dimension européenne, cit., p.539;  R. DESGAGNÉ, Integrating environmental values into the European Convention 
on Human Rights, in American Journal of International Law, 1995, p.284; A. BULTRINI, Il meccanismo di protezione 
dei diritti fondamentali della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo. Cenni introduttivi, in B. NASCIMBENE, La 
Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, Milano, 2002, p.18. 
26 Johtti Sapmelaccat Ry and others v. Finland, cit., p.12. 
case27 and in the Handölsdalen Sami Village case28: here, the villages are the legitimate titleholder 
of the disputed rights on the basis of four different factors: prescription from time immemorial; 
national laws concerning reindeer grazing and husbandry; custom; public international law, and 
especially article 27 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
If, on one hand, this confirms the possibility, for an association, to be recognised victim status, on 
the other, it also confirms the strict approach followed by the Court.  
 
3. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
The jurisprudence developed by the Inter-American Court in the sector of indigenous rights is 
characterised by a much more favourable attitude. Among the reasons for this difference we can 
include, in the first place, a statistical factor: indigenous populations are far more numerous in the 
American continent, and this has given rise to a higher number of cases. As a consequence, the 
Court has been “trained” to deal with this subject and has developed a different sensitivity in this 
regard.  
Secondly, the Inter-American Convention is a newer instrument if compared to the European 
Convention and it is less constrained by the “negative” conception of rights (which inspired the 
earlier European Convention). 
The principles developed by the Inter-American Court found their highest expression in the famous 
Saramaka case29 and, more recently, in the case Xákmok Kásek indigenous Community v. Paraguay. 
 
3.1 The refusal of a formalistic approach in dealing with procedural matters. 
One of the main features of the Saramaka case is the refusal, on the part of the Court, of the 
preliminary objections submitted by the State; these objections concerned the capacity of the 
claimants to act as representatives of the Saramaka peoples and their legal standing before the 
Court.  
As far as the first aspect is concerned, the respondent State questioned the capacity of the 
Association of Saramaka Authorities and of the Saramaka captains to file a petition in front of the 
Inter-American Commission, as they did not consult the Saramaka supreme leader. This implied a 
violation of article 44 of the Inter-American Convention, as the petitioners had no authorization to 
act on behalf of the whole community30. Article 44 is similar to article 34 of the European 
Convention, and states that “any person or group of persons, or any non-governmental entity legally 
                                                 
27 Konkäma and 38 Sami villages v. Sweden, cit., p.85-86. 
28 Handölsdalen Sami and others v. Sweden, cit., par.10. 
29 L. BRUNNER, The Rise of Peoples’ Rights in the Americas: The Saramaka People Decision of the Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights, in Chinese Journal of International Law, 2008,  p.699 SS; M.A. ORELLANA, Saramaka People 
v. Suriname, nota nella sezione “International decisions”, in American Journal of International Law, 2008, p.848 SS. 
30 Case of Saramaka people v. Suriname, cit., par.19. 
recognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the 
Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violations of this Convention by a State 
party”. 
Following customary norms of treaty interpretation, and taking into account the principle of effet 
utile, the Court analysed article 44 in conformity with the object and purpose of the treaty and 
affirmed that the “broad authority to file a petition is a characteristic feature of the Inter-American 
system for the protection of human rights” and, quoting previous case-law, stated that a person or a 
group of persons other than the alleged victim can file the petition31. 
On the basis of these premises, the necessity of obtaining the authorization of the leader of a 
community before submitting a petition on behalf of this latter was refused. “[T]he possibility of 
filing a petition” - we read in the sentence - “has been broadly drafted in the Convention and 
understood by the Tribunal”32. Therefore, not only the issue of representation is settled by the Court 
in a manner favourable to the indigenous community, but this situation is also a chance, for judges, 
to reaffirm the extensive approach informing the Convention and the Inter-American system. The 
reference, made by the Court, to the principle of effet utile, is of great importance, as it suggests the 
idea that a strict interpretation of formal requirements would be tantamount to a frustration of the 
aims pursued by the Convention. Finally, it is worth remarking that, once the formal problem of 
representation is solved, there is no actio popularis issue: nobody questions the fact that the 
complainants (the NGO and the representatives) and/or the persons on behalf of whom they act are 
personally and individually affected by the State behaviour. In other terms, we are very far away 
from the notion of victim generally applied by the ECHR.   
The second preliminary objection concerns the locus standi of the Saramaka representatives in front 
of the Court: according to the provisions of the Inter-American Convention, only  
States and international organisations can appear before the Court and only the Commission has the 
capacity to represent individuals' rights. Only once the Commission has submitted the complaint to 
the Court, can victims introduce autonomous requests and arguments33. 
The Court, though recognizing the limits set by the Convention to the participation of individuals to 
the system, states that “preventing the alleged victims from advancing their own legal arguments 
would be an undue restriction upon their right of access to justice, which derives from their 
condition as subjects of international human rights law.” In more general terms, “At the current 
stage of the Inter-American system […] the empowerment of the alleged victims, their next of kin 
or representatives to submit pleadings […] autonomously must be interpreted in accordance with 
their position as titleholders of the rights embodied in the Convention”.  
                                                 
31 Ibidem, par.22. 
32 Ibidem, par.23. 
33 Ibidem, par.25. 
The relevance of this statement is blatant; still, some observations can be formulated.  First of all, 
similarly to what we observed as far as the first preliminary objection, the Court seems to establishe 
an equivalence between effectiveness of rights and extensive interpretation of procedural 
requirements.  
Secondly, this extensive interpretation finds a further source of legitimisation in the role of the 
individual not only in the Inter-American system but also in general international law. 
The strength of these arguments appear even more clearly if we consider that, differently from the 
first preliminary objection, here the issue raised by the State is dealt with through an actual 
derogation from the Convention provisions, which explicitly reserve the possibility of submitting a 
complaint to the Commission. Here, the European system appears much more advanced: the 
individual has a pivotal role in the procedure, based on its direct dialogue with the Court.   
 
3.2 The recognition of the specificity of indigenous people and the necessity of actions of positive 
discrimination. 
One of the first points made by the Court in its sentence is the fact that the Saramaka people 
constitute a distinct tribal group with a special relationship with their territory. This premise is 
essential, because it is the element that founds the special treatment these groups are entitled to and 
the corresponding duties on the part of the State.  
Among the distinctive features of the Saramaka people is the existence of matrilinear clans, 
governed by local leaders34. The most relevant element, however, is the “strong spiritual community 
with the ancestral territory” they have traditionally used and occupied. Land is a source for the 
continuation of their life and cultural identity and it is part of their cultural, social and ancestral 
essence. Lands occupied by the communities are not only the physical place where they carry out 
their economic activities, but are also where their cultural and spiritual life takes place: the territory 
therefore has a sacred value35.  
The Court then confirms its previous case law36, according to which indigenous peoples require 
special measures that guarantee the full exercise of their rights and, especially, the enjoyment of 
property rights, with the aim of safeguarding their physical and cultural survival37. These factors are 
therefore at the basis of the special approach adopted.   
In the case submitted to the European Court by Sami communities these factors are almost 
completely neglected; nevertheless, the special relationship of a community with the territory did 
                                                 
34 Case of Saramaka people v. Suriname, cit., par.81. 
35 Ibidem, par.82. 
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Indigenous Community Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, 15 June 2005, Series C n.124, par.118-121 and 131; Case of 
Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, 17 June 2005, Series C n.125, par.124, 131, 135-137, 154. 
37 Case of Saramaka people v. Suriname, cit., par.85.  
receive some kind of regard in the jurisprudence concerning travelling peoples. The analysis of this 
case-law is outside the scope of the present work, because of the specificity and complexity of the 
issues involved (cases submitted to the ECHR mainly concern the occupation of public space for 
residential purposes and forced evacuation by police forces) and the very same qualification of 
travelling people as “tribal or indigenous community” is open to debate. Still, it is interesting to 
highlight that the recognition of the special traditions of travelling people and of the necessity of 
adopting positive measures in order to guarantee their rights and cultural identity does not lead the 
Court to divert from the standard approach based on the legality principle. In other terms, as 
incisively stated in the case Jane Smith v. the United Kingdom, “The Court will be slow to grant 
protection to those who, in conscious defiance of the prohibitions of the law, establish a home on an 
environmentally protected site”38. 
In this sense, it is also worth recalling the importance given by the Inter-American Court to the 
principle of non-discrimination, defined as a principle of jus cogens. It goes without saying that a 
legalistic approach such as the one used by the European Court can hardly be said to grant the 
principle such a high value39.  
 
 
3.3  The full recognition of the communal system of property and the relationship between 
possession of land and other human rights. 
The case-law of the Inter-American Court regarding communal property has been recently 
confirmed in the case  Xákmok Kásek indigenous Community v. Paraguay. The underlying idea of 
the reasoning of the Court is that “the close link that indigenous peoples have to their traditional 
lands, to the natural resources found that are part of their culture, and to the lands' other intangible 
elements, should be safeguarded by Article 21”40. This first element is put in relation with the 
communal tradition of collective property, meant as the ownership of the land to the group and not 
to the individual; moreover, the relationship with the land is not merely a “matter of possession and 
production”, but also a material and spiritual element41. Communal property means that possession 
“does not focus on individuals but on the group and the community” and, as a consequence, this 
conception does not necessarily coincide with the ideas of ownership and possession existing in 
internal legal orders42. Still, it deserves “equal protection” under article 21 of the Inter-American 
Convention, relating to the right to property.  
This last statement is of paramount importance, as it is the root and the basis of the whole 
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41 Ibidem, par.86. 
42 Ibidem, par.87. 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court concerning the right to property of indigenous people: 
the specificity of the concepts of possession and ownership used by indigenous communities must 
not determine a different application of article 21 but, on the contrary, it determines a commitment 
on the part of the State to guarantee an effective application of the Convention. “The failure to 
recognize the different versions of the right to use and enjoy goods that come from the culture, uses, 
customs, and beliefs of different peoples would be equivalent to arguing that there is only one way 
for things to be used and arranged, which in turn would make the protection granted by article 21 of 
the Convention meaningless for millions of individuals”43.  
The status of collective rights in public international law has also been the object of the concurring 
opinion of Judge Grossi, whose relevance is remarkable not only for the case at issue, but also for 
the evolution of public international law. After having underlined the existence and the importance 
of collective rights, which are sometimes a precondition for the enjoyment of other rights enshrined 
in the Inter-American Convention44, the Judge makes some general statements whose scope goes 
well beyond the dispute under examination: 
“It can be concluded that, pursuant to the progressive development of the International Law of 
Human Rights, it follows, on the one hand, to include the term “person” contained in various 
Articles of the Convention and as victims of human rights violations enshrined in it, not only the 
members, considered individually, of indigenous peoples, but also in regards to them as such, and 
on the other hand, consequently to consider among those rights those that pertain to the said 
peoples, because justice would not only be served, but, in addition, the jurisprudence would situate, 
more clearly and without margin for error, in the modern trend that is surfacing with more clarity in 
International Law that regulates this subject matter45.  
The difference with the jurisprudence of the European Convention is striking: in the cases 
concerning Sami populations, the discrepancy between the kind of property claimed by Sami people 
and the one existing in internal legal orders was used by the Court in order not to recognize 
indigenous rights, unless these rights found some kind of recognition in the internal legal order 
itself.  It will be interesting to see if and how the ECHR will deal with this issue in the future, as it 
will be very hard (if not impossible) not to take this general - and authoritative - statement into 
account.  
Once recognized that article 21 of the Convention offers full protection to indigenous lands, the 
Court is free to recall its previous case-law, in order to determine the duties of the State stemming 
from this protection: indigenous’ traditional possession of their lands has the same effect as a full 
land title granted by the State,  which is obliged to delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title of 
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the lands46.  
Another relevant contribution of the Xákmok Kásek sentence concerns the possibility, for the State, 
to justify the deprivation of land suffered by traditional communities on the basis of the 
impossibility, for the State, to expropriate the land, when this impossibility comes from the different 
economic productivity resulting from the use made by land by private landowners on the one hand 
and by the indigenous community on the other. The Court underlined that “the mercantilist 
perspective of the value of land, which views it only as a means of production in order to generate 
“wealth,” is inadmissible and inapplicable when it comes to the indigenous question, as it assumes a 
limited vision of reality, upon failing to consider the possibility of a concept different from our 
‘western’ way of seeing issues of indigenous rights and upon arguing that there is only one way to 
use and dispose of goods”47.   
Closely linked to this subject is the analysis of the impact that deprivation of land had on 
indigenous communities' lifestyle: the “collective cultural exhaustion” faced by the villages is one 
of the most serious consequences of State's failure to restore land48.  Traditional possession of land 
forms part of their identity which, in turn, “has a unique character due to the collective 
understanding they receive as a group”49.  
The European Court was never called to pronounce itself on such a specific aspect when dealing 
with the rights of Sami populations; still, in the Könkama case, when considering the existence of a 
prejudice to the interests of the community, it solely focused on the economic dimension. In this 
sense, it is also interesting to recall a recent decision by the Tribunal of First Instance of the 
European Union, faced with a question of legitimacy of a European regulation banning production, 
selling and trading of seal products. The Tribunal denied the existence of a direct and personal 
impact of the regulation on the Sami population, basing its analysis on purely economic elements 
and disregarding the cultural dimension underlined by the claimants50.  
Still, reducing State responsibility to the violation of the right to property (even considering the 
non-economical dimensions of this right) would not reflect the actual situation suffered by the 
indigenous community ;  that is why one of the rights invoked by the claimants, and recognized by 
the Court, is the right to life.  
In other terms, failure to restore land is not only a violation of the right to property, but also an 
infringement of this inalienable and absolute right, whose respect is a prerequisite for the enjoyment 
of all other rights51. Here the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court appears to be close to the 
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one of the ECHR: right to life encompasses not only the prohibition, for State's authorities, to 
intentionally deprive somebody of his life (negative obligation), but also a duty to carry out positive 
actions in order to guarantee this right (positive obligation)52.  
Still, the difference between the two systems for the protection of human rights derives from the 
fact that the European Court has never contemplated a violation of the right to life in situations 
different from the death of individuals and, therefore, even the more so in situations of the 
deprivation of a material good. 
On the contrary, according to the Inter-American Court, the State is responsible on one hand of the 
death of some individuals53, directly caused by the conditions they were obliged to live in (and the 
State was fully informed of) and, on the other hand, of the right to a dignified existence. The 
violation of this latter is analyzed by taking into consideration different factors: the access to and the 
quality of water54; the diet of the indigenous community55; the access to healthcare services56; 
education57. Of course these allegations have an autonomous aspect (as, for example, the State is 
obliged to provide medical care independently from individuals' place of residence); still, in 
practical terms, they are strongly linked to the problem of land deprivation, because the lack of 
services and the existence of dangerous conditions alleged, took place in the territories where the 
community was forced to live.  
This is confirmed by a report drafted by State officials, which “confirmed the state of vulnerability 
and necessity in which the members of the community were found because they did not have title to 
their land58”. 
 
4. The Endorois case before the African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights: an 
interesting example of dialogue among international human rights courts. 
The Endorois case derives from a complaint submitted by a NGO (the Centre for Minority Rights 
Development) on behalf of an indigenous community displaced by its ancestral land by their 
national State, Kenya59. The complainants alleged that the forced displacement constituted a 
violation of the Constitution of Kenya, of international law and of the African Charter of  Human 
and Peoples' Rights. 
This sentence is an interesting example of how indigenous issues are being dealt with by the most 
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recent system for the protection of human rights and, above all, of the circulation of principles 
taking place among international tribunals. 
Rights alleged to have been violated are article 8 (right to practice religion); article 14 (right to 
property); right 17  (right to culture); article 21 (right to free disposition of natural resources); right 
22 (right to development). 
Starting from the very definition of “indigenous peoples”, the African Commission shows (even if 
implicitly) to build on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, but also to  add new elements: 
according to African judges, the term “indigenous” is not intended to “create a special class of 
citizens”, but to “address historical and present-day injustices”60. If, on the one side, this statement 
reminds of the “special treatment” mentioned in the Saramaka case and, in a certain sense, of the 
positive discrimination encouraged by some European judges, on the other hand it goes one step 
further: the treatment accorded by the State to indigenous peoples is not a consequence of the 
intention to respect the identity of these communities; rather, the choice itself is to use the term 
“indigenous” aimed at granting this respect.   
The emphasis put by the African Commission on collective rights characterizing indigenous 
communities is underlined (also) through comparison with other international human rights 
instruments; with respect to these, the African Charter is “an innovative and unique […] document, 
in placing special emphasis on the rights of people”61. It is therefore the Court itself underlying its 
own specificity. 
Finally, the Saramaka case of the Inter-American Court is recalled in order to confirm the idea that 
collective rights protection has to be granted to groups beyond the “aboriginal understanding”, i.e. 
not only to indigenous peoples, but also to any group having the characteristics of a tribe62.  
A further example of circulation of principles is the one relating to the right to freely practice one's 
own religion: here the sentence shows several references to the case-law of both the Human Rights 
Council63 (called to interpret and apply the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) 
and the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights64. These references are aimed at 
strengthening the idea of a broad interpretation of the term “religion” and of the centrality of 
practice to religious freedom respectively. 
As far as article 14 (right to property), the Commission recalls its own jurisprudence, but also the 
case-law of the ECHR, according to which property rights “could also include the economic 
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resources and rights over the common land of the  applicants”65. It is interesting to note that the case 
quoted by the African Commission does recognize the possibility of considering certain rights and 
interests different from ownership of physical goods as “property rights” (therefore “possessions”) 
for the purpose of article 1 of the First Protocol66; still, it is also necessary to highlight that this case 
is not related to indigenous populations, but to the situation of internally displaced persons and 
especially of Kurdish people living in Turkey67.  
Further, the African Commission recalls the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni case, where the Inter-
American Court stated that possession of land must suffice for indigenous communities in order to 
claim title over land68. The duty for the State to recognize an indigenous group and therefore to 
grant it the right to juridical personality (necessary, in turn, to claim the right to property) finds its 
basis in the Saramaka case, whose main findings are summarized69.   
When it comes to the concept of positive discrimination, the reference is to the European Court and, 
precisely, to the Connors case, belonging to the set of cases focused on the situation of travelling 
people70. As it has been explained before, it would be hard to frame these cases solved by the ECHR 
into the conceptual framework of indigenous issues; still, the idea of non-discrimination developed 
within the “minorities sector” is reinterpreted by the African Commission in order to reinforce its 
arguments as far as indigenous rights are concerned.  
The necessity of “special measures” of protection owed by the State to the members of tribal 
communities is further confirmed through the Inter-American jurisprudence71 and another sentence 
issued by the ECHR regarding forced evictions of Kurdish people by Turkish police forces72 is 
recalled, in order to underline the need both to respect and protect the rights enshrined in the 
Convention73.  
Here the African Commission does not go into details of the European case-law and it is difficult to 
understand the value of this last reference, considering that a similar case has already been quoted 
when dealing with the autonomous meaning of the term “possession”. The point to be underlined 
(and which emerges from the use of italics in the text) is the value of the terms “respect” and 
“protect”: while the former merely indicates the duty of the State to abstain from behaviors that can 
violate the individual right, the latter refers to the theory of positive obligations and therefore to the 
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duty of the State to adopt positive measures in order to allow the enjoyment of rights.  
Still, de facto ownership is not sufficient, as only de jure ownership can fully realise indigenous 
rights; again, this idea is affirmed through recourse to the Inter-American jurisprudence74.  
The most striking example of dialogue among human rights courts is the reference made by African 
judges to the principle of proportionality, as applied by the ECHR in order to assess limitation of 
individual rights when there is a legitimate public interest. Here a leading case in the ECHR 
jurisprudence (the Handyside case75) is recalled, in order to affirm the idea that limitations of  rights 
must be proportionate76.  
The pattern described so far is repeated (mainly with reference with the Saramaka jurisprudence) 
for all the other rights claimed by the Endorois.  
Therefore, summarizing, it is not an exaggeration to say that the whole Endorois sentence is a 
network of concepts made through continuous reference to the practice of other international human 
rights tribunals. If, with regard to some aspects, the African judges like to underline their own 
specificity, in most cases external jurisprudence is a tool in order to give authority to the decision 
the African Commission wants to make.  
 
Conclusion. 
One of the effects of the fragmentation of international law is the multiplication of jurisdictional 
entities dealing with the same or similar subjects. Actors involved in this process are well-aware of 
each others and willing to communicate.  
Regional specificity is therefore balanced with the advantages of the emergence of a “common 
core” of principles concerning different sectors of international law, among which are indigenous 
rights. In this landscape, it is interesting not only to identify the emerging principles, but also to 
underscore the different roles and contributions of the players involved. 
Recent instruments and players are the carriers of innovative and “freer” ideas: this is evident, for 
example, if we consider the African system, where the collective nature of rights is somehow taken 
for granted and which, being a recent system, is not bound by heavy legacies such as rigid 
conceptual frameworks (see the concept of victim for the ECHR).  
On the other hand, when an authoritative source is necessary an old system such as the European 
one gives an essential contribution (see the principle of proportionality).  
The process of cross-fertilization we observe is an extremely interesting one, because quoting a 
source is not just a “passive” action of carrying a concept or an idea into a system. Rather, it is also 
an active, creative process, giving the quoted source new life and, sometimes, a new interpretation. 
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This could be the case, for example, of the ECHR case-law on the concept of possession: the 
reference to the ECHR case-law relating to the likelihood of a broad interpretation of this term, 
which has appeared in cases relating to internally displaced people, but quoted by the African 
Commission with respect to indigenous communities, could stimulate the European judge to widen 
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